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WORKING WITH AND FOR ANIMALS: GETTING THE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK RIGHT
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUMt
Friends of animals have lots to complain about and lots of work to
do. To the familiar list of horrors-torture of animals in the meat indus-
try, misery inflicted on puppies by puppy mills, the damages of research
using animals, the manifold harms endemic to the confinement of apes
and elephants in zoos, we have some further issues that have only be-
come issues in the past few decades: depletion of whale stocks by har-
pooning, the confinement of orcas and dolphins in marine theme parks,
the poaching of elephants and rhinos for the international black market,
the illicit trafficking of elephants from Africa into U.S. zoos, the devasta-
tion of habitat for many large mammals through climate change.' New
issues arise all the time. The world needs an ethical revolution, a con-
sciousness raising movement of truly international proportions.
But bad behavior also needs law. No major crimes against sentient
beings have been curbed by ethics alone, without the coercive force of
law-although it typically takes an ethical movement to goad law into
action. And so far, both in the U.S. and in the international community,
law has been lagging behind the evolving ethical consciousness of hu-
manity. Animals still lack standing under both U.S. and international
law. They also lack any rights of ethical consideration.2 All human ani-
mals are treated as persons and ends (no matter how immature the human
is), but all non-human animals are treated as mere things, as property.3
Law must find ways to make animals legal subjects and not mere ob-
jects.4 We need to move toward a world in which human beings are truly
Friends of Animals,5 not exploiters or users.
To make progress, we need theoretical approaches that are sound in
terms of reality, grappling with what we know about animals, and that
also direct law in a useful fashion. In this Article I will examine two ex-
t Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago
Law School. A discussion of this topic presented by Professor Nussbaum can be found at our web-
site, denverlawreview.org.
1. See Jane Goodall, Forward to STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, at ix, x-xi (2000).
2. See id. at xii.
3. See id
4. See id.
5. Wild Life Law Program, Nussbaum to Activists: 'Let's Have Work and Hope,' FRIENDS
OF ANIMALS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.friendsofanimals.org/news/2017/february/nussbaum-
activists-'let's-have-work-and-hope' (summarizing remarks by the author at an event co-hosted by




tremely influential approaches to animal entitlements in philosophy, both
of which have implications for law and policy: the "So Like Us' ap-
proach and the "Least Common Denominator" approach. I shall argue
that both are defective intellectually, and also in terms of strategy. A
version of the Capabilities Approach, an approach to justice for both
humans and other animals that I have developed over the years, does far
better in directing ethical attention. Does it also do better in directing
legal strategy?
THE "So LIKE Us" APPROACH
One prominent and influential approach to animal ethics and law
seeks recognition of legal personhood, and some autonomy rights, for a
specific set of animal species, on the grounds of their human-like capaci-
ties. This approach is associated, above all, with activist and author Ste-
ven A. Wise. Wise is one of the most significant pioneers of animal law.
His 2000 book Rattling the Cage took the field of animal ethics into law,
with striking results.9 His course on animal law at Harvard Law School
was one of the first law school courses of its kind. And, as the leading
figure in the 2016 documentary Unlocking the Cage, he eloquently de-
scribes to the film's many viewers the goals of the Nonhuman Rights
Project, which he leads; the film follows his legal battles to win limited
personhood rights for several chimpanzees being held in captivity.i0
Wise's focus in the 2000 book was on chimpanzees and bonobos,"
but by now he explicitly includes all four species of great apes, as well as
elephants (presumably all three species) and whales and dolphins (pre-
sumably all species of both of those).12 His argument rests heavily on
claims about the similarity of these animals to human beings. They are,
he says, self-conscious, they are self-directing, they have a theory of
mind, they have culture, they are not "cabined by instinct," they are able
to contemplate their own future. In general they are "really really
smart."13 Centrally, he holds that they are "autonomous creatures" who,
for that reason, should have "autonomous lives."1 4
Wise is not a philosopher, and he does not explain which of the
concepts of autonomy used by philosophers he has in mind. Since he also
says that he thinks of chimpanzees as at the level of a five-year-old hu-
man child, it is not clear that he really should ascribe autonomy to them,
6. See generally STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (2000) (using the "So Like Us"
approach to argue for legal changes for animals).
7. See infra Section titled The Least Common Denominator Approach.
8. WISE, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. UNLOCKING THE CAGE (Pennebaker Hegedus Films 2016).
11. WISE, supra note 6.
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if that means, as it typically does, the ability to criticize one's desires in
the light of some higher-order principles, or, as Kant famously held, the
ability to free oneself from the influence of religion and culture." Proba-
bly he means some less exacting form of self-directedness, such as the
ability to choose among alternatives. (But surely many other species of
animals exercise choice!) In any case, as both book and film repeatedly
emphasize, Wise thinks these species of animals are very like humans,
and he makes that likeness the basis for his crusade to win them some
limited legal rights.16 It would surely be valuable for him to investigate
the notion of autonomy further, since we do not think that five-year-old
children should be emancipated from their parents, nor do we think that
they have a right to an independent self-planned life (or other rights as-
sociated with that, such as the right to sexual consent, the right to decide
on one's own medical treatment, and so forth). Nor does Wise actually
maintain that autonomy rights entitle apes to life without some type of
supervision or guardianship: he reassures courts that he is seeking only to
have the badly treated chimps transferred to a different supervised set-
ting, not to have them utterly freed.17 It is never made clear why he
thinks that guardianship is good for apes, and he presumably does not
think that human guardianship is good for whales and elephants, alt-
hough he does not comment on this. So the concept of autonomy and its
implications for animal lives remain unclear in his conception. One
hopes that Wise will clarify the notion of autonomy rights in further
work.
By showing how like us animals are, Wise hopes to demonstrate, he
says in the film, that the line typically drawn in law between humans and
animals is irrational and needs rethinking.'8 If we think that children de-
serve some rights, albeit with some qualifications and limitations, we
should grant that these species of animals also have rights. It is irrational
and inconsistent to treat all humans as persons, bearing rights, and to
treat all animals as like mere things. At this point Wise uses an analogy
to slavery: just as law used to treat slaves as mere property, and we have
now seen that this was morally heinous, so too we should realize that our
current treatment of animals is morally heinous.19 In the film the slavery
analogy gets strong pushback from some of Wise's interlocutors, pre-
sumably because it can be read as suggesting, inappropriately, that Afri-
can-Americans are like chimps, which is not the idea he means to con-
15. See generally J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY (1998) (providing the
history of the idea of autonomy, Kant's view, and its influence on modem concepts); GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988) (leading philosophical account in
terms of higher-order desires).
16. See WISE, supra note 6; UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.





vey.2 0 So he backs away from the analogy; but he does not back away
from the core idea that we must make a transition in law from thinking of
animals as mere things and property to seeing them as persons.21 He re-
peatedly points out that corporations are given rights under law; the ex-
tension of rights to self-directing animals is surely an easier step than
that!22
Throughout both book and film, Wise presents lots of evidence that
23the core species of animals have human-like abilities of many types.
His central rhetorical strategy in the film is to show us chimpanzees and
other apes doing things that the viewer will immediately recognize as
human-like: using sign language, giving displays of empathy when
shown a film of humans displaying emotions, and so forth.2 4
The idea that some animals are surprisingly like humans, and that
this has implications for the way we should treat them, is not new. In 55
B.C. the Roman leader Pompey staged a combat between humans and
elephants.2 5 Surrounded in the arena, the animals perceived that they had
26no hope of escape. According to Pliny, they then "entreated the crowd,
trying to win their compassion with indescribable gestures, bewailing
their plight with a sort of lamentation."2 7 The audience, moved to pity
and protest by their plight, rose to curse Pompey-feeling, writes Cicero,
that the elephants had a relation of commonality (societas) with the hu-
man race.28
Not all religions and world-views have held that humans are a supe-
rior species. Buddhism and Hinduism have more generous views of the
world of nature.2 9 As Richard Sorabji shows, even in the Western tradi-
tion the humans-on-top view was not held by most of the ancient Greco-
Roman schools of philosophy, most of whom refused to draw a sharp
line between humans and other animals, and some of whom strictly pro-
hibited meat-eating, along with all infliction of pain on animals.3 0 But the
ancient Greek and Roman Stoics, enormously influential both in antiqui-
ty and in the development of Christian ethics, did hold that non-human




23. See id.; WISE, supra note 6.
24. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
25. GAFUS PLINIUS SECUNDUS, PLINY THE ELDER: THE NATURAL HISTORY BOOK VII 251
(Tyler T. Travillian ed., Bloomsbury Academic 2015) (n.d.) [hereinafter PLINY]; CASSIUS DIO, DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY 361 (Earnest Cary, trans., Harvard University Press 4th prtg. 1969) (n.d.).
26. See DIo, supra note 25, at 361, 363; RICHARD SORABJI, ANIMAL MINDS AND HUMAN
MORALS 124 n.21 (1993) (quoting PLINY, supra note 25).
27. SORABJI, supra note 26, at 124 n.21 (quoting PLINY, supra note 25).
28. Id. at 124-25.
29. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 320 (2006) [hereinafter FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE].
30. Id. at 125.
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quasi-divine, and that on that account we can use them as we wish.31
Stoicism influenced Christianity, but so too did Judaism, which similarly
held that the human being is special. Made in the image of God, the hu-
man is the only truly intelligent and spiritual being, and the only being to
whom salvation is open.
This view is still the dominant view in Judaism and Christianity.3 2
And it is the dominant view, as well, among moral philosophers whose
intuitions have been formed in that tradition. A notable example is lead-
ing moral philosopher Richard Kraut, who, in an important paper on the
notion of goodness holds that we must be able to say why human life is
special, in order to justify our intuitions that it is all right to do medical
experiments on animals but not on humans.33 Kraut never proposes to
criticize those intuitions, and I mildly suggest that he might want to do
that!34
Wise knows his audience, and he makes the shrewd guess that if he
is to move the needle on animal rights he will have to begin where the
audience is. He calls this beginning "the first salvo in a strategic war"
and also talks of "kicking the first door open."35 So he clearly isn't indif-
ferent to the wider project of winning rights for all animals. And his
close and determined attention to the capacities and deprivations of some
species is surely commendable. Nonetheless, one might raise worries.
The choice of a theoretical framework influences where we will be able
to go. It is important to get the theory right for reasons of truth and un-
derstanding. And it is also important to get a strategy that starts us in the
right direction, rather than pointing us down a blind alley.
What, then, might be some problems with Wise's strategy from the
philosophical viewpoint? Most obviously, it validates and plays upon the
old familiar idea of a scala naturae (ladder of nature) with us at the top.
Some animals get in, but only because they are like us. The first door is
opened, but then it is slammed shut behind us: nobody else gets in. In-
stead of the old line, we have a slightly different line, but it is not really
all that different, and most of the animal world still lies outside in the
dark domain of mere thinghood.
31. See id.
32. There are dissident strands in both, and when Pope Francis told a little boy that his dead
dog was in heaven, his remark, heretical nd rapidly withdrawn, still picked up on something that
many people like to believe. At the time of my adult bat mitzvah in 2008, I was told by our cantor
that Israeli animal activists have rewritten the Kaddish, or prayer for the dead, in order to include
prayer for dead animals. I considered using this version, although in the end I did not because it is
one of the few prayers that Reform Jews learn by heart, and they would be very upset to encounter
new Hebrew words.
33. See Richard Kraut, What is Intrinsic Goodness?, 105 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 450, 456
(2010).
34. See Martha Nussbaum, Response to Kraut, 105 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 463, 467 (2010).
35. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
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The idea of the ladder of nature is essentially a religious idea,
whether in its Stoic form (where only humans partake in Zeus's rational
plan for the universe) or in its Judeo-Christian form. It derives from an-
thropocentric religions, according to which God, imagined as rather like
us only better, using speech, reasoning, and language, makes us special,
like God, and then values us because we are Godlike. The idea of superi-
ority is not drawn from looking at nature, and it does not correspond to
what we see when we look at nature, if we can put aside our arrogance.
What we see are thousands of different animal life-forms, all exhibiting a
kind of ordered striving toward survival, flourishing, and reproduction.
Life-forms don't line up to be graded on a single scale: they are just
wonderfully different. If we want to play the rating game, let's play it
fairly. We humans win the prize on the IQ and language parameters. And
guess who invented those tests! But many animals are much stronger and
swifter. Birds do vastly better on spatial perception and the ability to
remember distant destinations. Most animals have a keener sense of
smell. Our hearing is very limited: some animals (e.g., dogs) hear higher
frequencies than we can and many (elephants, whales) hear lower fre-
quencies.3 6 We sing opera, birds sing amazing birdsong, whales sing
whale songs. Is one "better?" To a lover of music that's like asking
whether we should prefer Mozart or Wagner: they are so different that it
is a silly waste of time to compare them on a single scale.
As for life-sustaining abilities: rats are far more successful repro-
ducers and survivors; numerous animals from tubeworms to bowhead
whales have greater individual longevity. Shall we ask about moral abili-
ties? Well, we pride ourselves there, but we humans engage in depths of
deliberate cruelty and torture known to no other animal species, and no
other species makes systematic war against its own kind. Do we think we
are the most beautiful? Jonathan Swift was persuasive when he depicted
Gulliver, after years with the lovely horselike Houyhnhnms, finding the
human shape and smell disgusting.37 No other animal has such arrogance
about its beauty. At the same time, no other animal hates itself and flees
from itself.
In short, if we line up the abilities fairly, not prejudging in favor of
the things we happen to be good at, many other animals "win" many
different ratings games. But by this time the whole idea of the ratings
game is likely to seem a bit silly and artificial. What seems truly interest-
ing is to study the sheer differentness and distinctiveness of each form of
life. Anthropocentrism is a phony sort of arrogance. How great we are!
If only all creatures were like us, well, some are, a little bit. Rather than
unsettling our thinking in a way that might truly lead to a revolutionary
36. See HAL WHITEHEAD & LUKE RENDELL, THE CULTURAL LIVES OF WHALES AND
DOLPHINS 120-21 (2016)
37. JONATHAN SwIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 135-84 (6th ed. 2005).
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embrace of animal lives, Wise just keeps the old thinking and the old line
in place, and simply shifts several species to the other side.
The scala naturae is not just intellectually lazy and complacent: it is
also dangerous in other ways. It discourages useful self-criticism. It leads
to ugly projects in which humans imagine transcending their merely an-
imal bodies, by casting aspersions on the smells and fluids of the body.38
These projects are so often accompanied by attempts to subordinate some
other group of human beings, on the grounds that they are the true ani-
mals.39 Bad smell, contaminating physicality, and hypersexuality are
imputed to some relatively powerless subgroup, as an excuse for violent
types of subordination. One may trace these ideas in U.S. racism, in the
Indian caste hierarchy, in misogyny everywhere, in homophobia.4 0
Wise's strategy does nothing to undermine these baneful human practic-
es; indeed it reinforces them with its line-drawing. When what we need
is a wholly new way of seeing our bodies, it gives us the same old way,
with a few minor adjustments.
Wise's approach, furthermore, cuts most of the animal kingdom
adrift with no help from his interventions. He clearly doesn't want this
result, but it's hard to know what his theory yields for the terrible suffer-
ing of pigs and chickens, for the loss of habitat by polar bears and dozens
of other wild species. Or rather, it is not hard to know what he offers, but
all too easy: he offers nothing. A wholly new approach would need to be
invented once we move outside the special sphere of the species who are
so like us. He gives us no idea what that new approach would be. What is
totally lacking is wonder at the diversity of nature, love of its many dis-
tinctive forms of life.
There is a further disturbing consequence of the "so like us" ap-
proach: it leads to a focus on artificial performances that are not really
characteristic of the species as it lives its life in the wild. Thus "Unlock-
ing the Cage" spends a good deal of time on sign language, and it is in-
deed true, and impressive, that chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas can
learn sign language.4 1 But they don't use it when they are not living
among humans. Indeed, although dolphins occasionally carry human-
38. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND
THE LAW (2004) (critiquing the role that shame and disgust play in human beings' individual and
social lives and, in particular, the law).
39. See generally id
40. See id.; see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010) (arguing that disgust has long been among the
fundamental motivations of those who are fighting for legal discrimination against lesbian and gay
citizens). On December 16-18, 2016, the University of Chicago Center in Delhi, India, held a large
conference on Prejudice, Stigma, and Discrimination to investigate the relationships among these
types of disgust-subordination and yet others. The papers are planned for a volume to be edited by
Zoya Hasan, Aziz Huq, Martha C. Nussbaum, and Vidhu Verma. Of particular interest for readers of
the present paper will be Dipesh Chakrabarty's paper on the caste hierarchy, in which he argues that
we must totally reimagine our relationship to nature.
41. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
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learned behavior with them back into the wild and teach it to other dol-
42
phins, I am not aware of any case in which apes have done the same
thing. It just isn't useful to them. And although Wise might have demon-
strated the empathy and emotion of apes and elephants in many ways, as
Frans De Waal has done for decades,4 3 he instead dwells, in the film, on
an example of empathy that is conveyed through the use of sign lan-
guage.4 4 A gorilla watches a movie in which a child is saying goodbye to
its family, and makes the signs for sad and so forth. Again, using sign
language to indicate emotion is something apes do for and to humans,
not something they do among themselves-although among themselves
they have, as De Waal repeatedly shows, plenty of ways of communi-
cating emotion.45 Wise presumably likes the sign language-empathy ex-
ample because it helps him establish likeness to us. But it is a pet trick. It
becomes very hard, in fact, to understand the rationale by which Wise
condemns some taught ape tricks, such as the ape doing karate kicks, and
yet loves and foregrounds the language tricks. Both are similar, it seems
to me (assuming the karate was taught through positive reinforcement
and not cruelty): parlor tricks that show something about the animal, but
not something that lies at the heart of its form of life. Whether it is ethi-
cal to teach such tricks can surely be debated, and I'm sure Wise would
defend the language trick for what it teaches us. But that's just it: what it
teaches us, not what it does for and in the animal life.
Wise argues that we need to begin by focusing on only a few rights
for a few species, because people will be terrified if the door is open to
all sorts of rights for all sorts of creatures. Will my dog be able to sue
me? Will I have to give up eating meat? But that all depends on what is
being asked. Sure, if someone said all animals should be given the right
to vote, people would go crazy. But Wise's approach also has to exercise
caution. If Wise were asking that all apes would immediately be allowed
to roam with no guardianship or supervision, people would also go crazy,
so he insists that this is not what he is asking - a concession that com-
plicates his demand for habeas corpus. Any proposal, then, can prove
unacceptably radical if its demands are extreme. But a proposal that asks
for a species-specific level of ethical consideration for a wide range of
creatures need not do that. And people appreciate consistency and theo-
retical integrity. Sooner or later, people will wake up to the fact that
Wise is playing bait and switch: likeness to humans for some creatures,
some other as yet unannounced rationale for other creatures.
42. See WHITEHEAD & RENDELL, supra note 36, at 120-21 (2016) (describing the example of
a dolphin standing vertically on its tail).
43. See generally FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED (1996) (demonstrating all kinds of
animals respond to social rules, help each other, share food, resolve conflict to mutual satisfactions,
and even develop a crude sense of justice and fairness).
44. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
45. See WAAL, supra note 43.
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THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR APPROACH
It is then with a certain relief that we turn, or return, to the theoreti-
cal approach to animal entitlements that has led the way, in the Western
tradition, since the end of the eighteenth century: the Utilitarian ap-
proach, pioneered by Utilitarianism's founder, Jeremy Bentham,46 and
best known from the important work of Peter Singer. I have discussed
the contributions and shortcomings of the Utilitarian approach to animals
in quite a few publications, so here I must be brief.4 7
Bentham famously held that the salient ethical facts, and indeed the
only salient ethical facts, are pleasure and pain.48 He strongly insisted
that pleasures and pains do not vary along any qualitative dimension, but
only along several dimensions of quantity (of which duration and intensi-
ty are the most important).4 9 The goal of each individual sentient being
is, and ought to be,50 the maximization of net pleasure. The goal of a
rational society ought to be the maximization of net pleasure for all of
society's members.
It is at this point that Bentham points out that given the salience of
pleasure and pain, there is no good reason to exclude animals from the
Utilitarian calculus. "The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can
they talk? But, Can they suffer?"5 I Bentham was keenly aware of animal
suffering, and developed strong arguments against hunting and fishing
for sport, as well as other cruel practices.52 Peter Singer follows Ben-
tham's line.53
What is undoubtedly valuable about the Benthamite approach is its
emphasis on the terrible cruelty of human behavior to animals and the
suffering it inflicts. Pointing to the commonality between humans and
animals in respect of suffering, moreover, is to point to something clearly
46. See generally Jadran Lee, Bentham on the Moral and Legal Status of Animals (June 2002)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with ProQuest Information and
Learning Company, Ann Arbor, MI).
47. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1506 (2001) (critiquing WISE, supra note 6); FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 29,
at 325-407; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANIMAL ETHICS 228 (Tom L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey eds., 2011) (reject-
ing the classical utilitarian approach to the ethics of animal treatment and proposes a theoretical
approach); Martha C. Nussbaum & Rachel Nussbaum Wichert, The Legal Status of Whales and
Dolphins (forthcoming 2017).
48. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J. H. Bums & H. L. A. Hart
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
49. See generally id.
50. Bentham notoriously leaves the move from "is" to "ought" undefended.
51. BENTHAM, supra note 48 (emphasis in original).
52. See generally Lee, supra note 46. Much of Bentham's work remains unpublished in an
archive at University College, London, and is gradually being published; Lee was able to study some
of the unpublished and also all of the recently published material.
53. See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975) (arguing the interest of animals
should be considered because of their ability to experience suffering).
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relevant to animals themselves, and a salient fact about their lives.
Chimpanzees can learn language but do not care much about it. All ani-
mals flee pain and give evidence of strong aversion to it.
Moreover, now that more of Bentham's work is becoming available,
we are able to see that Bentham was undertaking what Steve Wise defi-
nitely does not undertake, and what I suggested we must undertake: a
radical assault on the human-animal divide in Christian ethics and its
ranking of lives and abilities, its puritanism about bodily pleasure, its
relative indifference to bodily pain. Especially in the radical work Not
Paul But Jesus, published in full only in 2013,54 Bentham's insistence
that pleasures differ only in quantity can be seen clearly as a radical as-
sault on Victorian ideas of "higher" and "lower" pleasures, aimed at es-
tablishing the value of nonmarital and unconventional sexual relations
and at decriminalizing homosexual sex. So Bentham is not being obtuse
when he says all pleasures are one, he is being radical, and his radicalism
leads him to an embrace of the body that offers a good basis for a re-
stored attitude toward animals.
Still, there remain very serious problems with the Benthamite ap-
proach. The first and most obvious is its account of the social goal: the
maximization of net pleasure. Bentham tells us little about how we
should aggregate pleasures across creatures, and little about how quanti-
ties would be assigned to pleasure and pain. But on any plausible reading
the calculus produces an aggregate figure, whether a total or an average,
and it has no account of the permissible floor. Bentham was averse to the
idea of rights, and that means that he offers us no account of the bare
minimum beneath which a creature should not be permitted to fall. Eve-
rything depends on uncertain empirical calculations. On the average con-
ception, according to which we are supposed to maximize average utility
understood as net pleasure, egregious harms to animals will still be al-
lowed by the view, so long as we can show that these harms raise the
average pleasure in the world, and no pleasures are disqualified-not, for
example, by the fact that they are malicious or sadistic. It is far from
clear that the calculus gives us reasons to stop humans from inflicting
torment on animals, since humans greatly enjoy those bad practices. The
argument that this torment is unjustified rests on a fragile and uncertain
empirical calculation. On the total conception, according to which we are
supposed to maximize total utility, things are even more problematic: for
we can add to the world's total by deliberately bringing into the world
creatures, of whatever species, whose lives are extremely miserable, just
so long as the lives exhibit a slim net balance of pleasure over pain.
Meat-eating practices do result in the deliberate creation of millions of
54. JEREMY BENTHAM, NOT PAUL, BUT JESUS (London 1823); see also Martha C. Nussbaum,
Love from the Point of View of the Universe: Walt Whitman and the Utilitarian Imagination, in
POWER, PROSE, AND PURSE (Alison LaCroix, Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds.) (forth-
coming) (under review at Oxford Univ. Press).
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animals who would never have existed otherwise, and this could end up
looking like a good thing under Utilitarianism, depending on how we
measure pleasures and pains in those lives. In general, Benthamism sup-
plies no account of urgent entitlements grounded in justice, and we badly
need such an account to make sense of the human-animal relationship.
A second problem lies in Bentham's insistence in reducing quality
to quantity. We get a very narrow account of what is important in animal
(including human animal) lives: just pleasure and the avoidance of pain,
and recall that Bentham insists that all pleasure is qualitatively similar.
Thus there is no room for the special value of free movement, of com-
panionship and relationships with other members of one's kind, of senso-
ry stimulation, of a pleasing and suitable habitat. In this failing Bentham-
ism converges with Wise's approach: both refuse to consider fully, and
positively value, the many complex forms of life that animals actually
lead. Pleasure and pain simply are not the only relevant issues when
evaluating an animal's chances to flourish.
This problem would be less grave if deprivation of some aspect of
its natural form of life always produced a commensurate pain. Then Ben-
tham might be able to get to the correct conclusion, albeit by a defective
route. It has long been argued that his is not the case for human beings:
the familiar economic concept of "adaptive preferences" refers to the fact
that humans who are deprived in some area often tailor their preferences
and satisfactions to the reduced way of life they have known,55 probably
in order to avoid pointless longing and striving. Thus women who are
brought up thinking that a "good woman" does not get a university edu-
cation or participate in politics will very likely not feel pain at her exclu-
sion from these things.56 It takes a consciousness raising movement to
get her to see what she is missing and why it could be important for
her.57 Unfortunately the same is very likely true for many animals. An
animal raised in captivity cannot form an imaginative conception of a
wild habitat, and thus cannot yearn or long for it. Nor can an animal cut
off from characteristic social interactions with other members of its kind
imagine what those interactions are like, or grieve for their absence. Iron-
ically, then, if humans do only a little depriving the animal may be able
to feel pain about it, and that pain will register in the Utilitarian calculus;
but if humans deprive the animal in deeper and more fundamental ways,
they may not even get to the point of missing what they don't know, and
that pain will not register in the Utilitarian calculus.
55. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ch. 2, Passion (2000).
56. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000)




Finally, Bentham seems to think of pleasure as a feeling.58 That
feeling is typically produced by an activity: the pleasure of eating is pro-
duced by eating, the pleasures of friendship by friendship. But of course
it might be produced in some other way. Philosopher Robert Nozick
imagines an "experience machine": hooked up to that machine you
would have the impression that you were eating, talking to your friends,
and so forth, and you would have the enjoyment related to those pur-
suits-but without doing anything at all. 5 9 Nozick bets that most people
would reject the experience machine, since being the author of their own
actions is important to them, not just the experiences they have.60 Surely
the same is true of animals, and Wise is correct to emphasize the im-
portance of agency. He just defines it too narrowly: most animals like
doing things; being the author of their actions matters to them. The Utili-
tarian approach has a hard time accounting for this.61
Utilitarianism, then, has great advantages but also great problems.
RESPECTING THE DIVERSITY OF ANIMAL LIVES
Both of the approaches I have considered have a common problem:
they reduce the complexity of animal species into an unhelpful simplici-
ty. Wise levels up: reason is the thing, and look how many creatures have
it. Singer and the other Utilitarians level down: pain is the thing, and all
creatures have it and have it alike. What we need is the complexity of
reality: an approach that looks at the whole of animal nature without a
single linear ranking, one that focuses on our evil doing when we cause
pain, but also on the complicated capacities of animals for many types of
fascinating activity, the need of all animals for full and flourishing lives.
The Capabilities Approach (hereafter CA) was developed initially
with only the human case in mind.62 But it was developed using materials
drawn from Aristotle, who advocated that we seek what is shared among
all animals and seek a "common explanation" for the self-maintaining
and self-reproducing striving that characterizes all animal lives.63 So it is
not surprising that it proved easy to extend it to the lives of animals.6 4
The CA argues that the right thing to focus on, when asking how well a
group of humans (or a nation) is doing, is to look not at average utility,
and not simply at opulence (GDP per capita), but, rather, at what people
58. Not all agree: the Western philosophical tradition includes thinkers who see pleasure as an
activity (Epicurus, Aristotle), and others who think that pleasure is closely linked to activity, "super-
vening" on activity (Aristotle again, since Aristotle has two different views).
59. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974).
60. Id.
61. Of course one might invent a special pleasure and call it the pleasure of agency, but unless
this pleasure is understood to be qualitatively, not just quantitatively, different from other pleasures,
it will be difficult to capture the intuition contained in the example.
62. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH 17-18 (2011) [hereinafter CREATING CAPABILITIES].
63. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, ARISTOTLE'S DE MOTUANIMALIUM (1978).
64. See CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 62, at 18.
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are actually able to do and to be.65 The best approach focuses on people's
substantial freedoms to choose things that they value.66 The right ques-
tion to ask is, "What are you able to do and be, in areas of importance in
your life," and the answer to that question is the account of that person's
"capabilities."6 7 I have distinguished three different types of capabilities.
First, there are basic capabilities, the innate equipment that is the basis
for further development.68 Second are internal capabilities, abilities of a
person developed through care and nurture. Developing internal capabili-
ties already requires social resources.6 9 But a person might have these
inside, so to speak, and still not be fully capable of choice and action.
Such a person might, for example, be capable of political speech but de-
nied the chance to act politically. So, the really important type of capabil-
ity for a decent society is what I call combined capabilities, internal
capabilities plus external conditions that make choice available.7 0
Thus far, capabilities specify a space of comparison, and that is the
main use of the approach in Amartya Sen's work, as in the Human De-
velopment Reports of the United Nations Development Programme of
which he was a leading architect.71 But in keeping with my interest in
theories of justice and in constitution-making, I have gone further, using
the idea of capabilities to describe a partial approach to basic justice.72
For that purpose, of course, we must get definite about content-as users
of the approach comparatively do already in their choice of examples. I
have proposed a list of ten capabilities that must be secured up to a min-
imum threshold level, if a nation is to have any claim to justice:
The Central Human Capabilities
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal
length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to
be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including repro-
ductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to
be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domes-
tic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for
choice in matters of reproduction.
65. See id at 18-19.
66. Id. at 18.
67. See id at 18, 20.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. (characterizing the combined capabilities approach briefly). The same list of Central
Capabilities appears in all my publications dealing with the approach.
71. See id at 17.
72. See id. at 19-20.
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4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses,
to imagine, think, and reason -- and to do these things in a "truly hu-
man" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education,
including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathemati-
cal and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought
in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of
one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able
to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of ex-
pression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and free-
dom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences
and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at
their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing,
gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional develop-
ment blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means
supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be cru-
cial in their development.)
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good
and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life.
(This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious ob-
servance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms
of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.
(Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that consti-
tute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the
freedom of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; be-
ing able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to
that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, na-
tional origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation
to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over one's Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political
choices that govern one's life; having the right of political partici-
pation, protections of free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others;
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having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others;
having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work,
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason
and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition
with other workers.
73
This list, humble and revisable, is an abstract template that can be
further specified in accordance with a particular nation's history and ma-
terial circumstances.7 4
Now let us turn to animals. As you can see, number 8 on the list al-
ready includes relationships with other species and the world of nature as
a central political good. But that is certainly not enough. I have also
urged adopting a similar list of capabilities as ethical goals for all ani-
mals.75 In the human case, I justify the list by arguing that these opportu-
nities are inherent in the notion of a life worthy of human dignity.76 I
then argue that dignity belongs to other animals as well: all are worthy of
lives commensurate with the many types of dignity inherent in their
many forms of life. 7 7 All animals, in short, should have a shot at flourish-
ing in their own way.
In some concrete ways the human list is a bad fit: freedom of the
press and employment opportunities have a place in human lives that
they do not have in other animal lives. But if we simply focus on the
large general categories, the list seems to be a good guide, which can
then be specified further for each animal after a study of its form of life.
If the human list is a template for constitution-making, so too is the list
for each animal species: a written basis for an unwritten constitution for
that species. It tells us the right things to look for, the right questions to
ask.
Very generally, all animals deserve ethical consideration, meaning
ethically informed concern for the types of lives they are trying to lead.
The list directs our attention to a host of pertinent factors. What life span
is normal for that species in the wild? What is the physical condition of a
healthy animal? What human acts invade or impair the bodily integrity of
that sort of animal? What types of movement from place to place are
normal and pleasurable for that sort of animal? What types of sensory
and imaginative stimulation does this animal seek, and what is it to keep
that animal in an unacceptably deficient sensory environment? What is it
for that sort of animal to live in crippling and intolerable fear or depres-
sion, or with a lack of bonds of concern? What types of affiliations does
this animal seek in the wild, what sorts of groups, both reproductive and
73. Id. at 33-34.
74. See id. at 36.
75. See id at 158.
76. See id at 36.
77. See id at 161.
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social, does it form? What types of communication does the animal en-
gage in, using what sensory modalities? What is it for the animal to be
humiliated and not respected? What is it for this animal to play and enjoy
itself? Does the animal have meaningful relationships with other species
and the world of nature? What types of objects does this animal use and
need to control if it is to live its life?
Capability number 6, practical reason, pertains more to some ani-
mals than to others, in that some engage in more complicated strategies
and plans. Perhaps that is what Wise means by autonomy.78 But all ani-
mals direct their own course by their own powers of thought, whatever
those are. Again, political participation seems not pertinent to non-
human animals, but of course it is pertinent for them, just as for us: it is
through politics that the conditions of life are agreed to, and someone
who has no political standing has no voice in choices that govern his or
her life. So too for animals: if they have no legal standing and no legal
status that guarantees ethical consideration, then they have no voice in
what happens to them. As Wise notes, beings and groups that cannot
literally speak have been granted legal standing: humans with profound
cognitive disabilities, young children, and corporations.7 9 So it is clear
that political participation can pertain to a creature even when its exer-
cise of that capability must take place through forms of advocacy or sur-
rogacy.
Each creature, then, deserves ethical consideration for what it is,
and a kind of constitution that specifies what harms it should not be per-
mitted to suffer-not in terms of its likeness to humans or its possession
of some least-common-denominator property, but in terms of what it is
itself, the form of life it leads.
What does this mean for law? One example may help carry our dis-
cussion further. For there is a happy harbinger of what may be a new era
in law, in the form of a remarkable 2016 opinion by the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Pritzker,8 0 Ninth Circuit ruled that the U. S. Na-
vy violated the law in seeking to continue a sonar program that impacted
the behavior of whales. 8 To some extent he opinion is a technical exer-
cise in statutory interpretation of the Marine Mammals Protection Act:
the court says that the fact that a program has "negligible impact" on
Marine Mammals does not exempt it from a separate statutory require-
ment, namely that it establish means of "effecting the least practicable
adverse impact on" marine mammal species.8 2 What is significant, and
78. UNLOCKING THE CAGE, supra note 10.
79. Id.
80. 828 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
81. See id. at 1142; see generally JOSHUA HORWITZ, WAR OF THE WHALES: A TRUE STORY
(2015) (describing the sonar program in detail).
82. Pritzker, 828 F.3d at 1142.
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fascinating, is that the argument relies heavily on a consideration of
whale capabilities that the program disrupts:
Effects from exposures below 180 dB can cause short-term disrup-
tion of abandonment of natural behavior patterns. These behavioral
disruptions can cause affected marine mammals to stop communi-
cating with each other, to flee or avoid an ensonified area, to cease
foraging for food, to separate from their calves, and to interrupt mat-
ing. LFA sonar can also cause heightened stress responses from ma-
rine mammals, Such behavioral disruptions can force marine mam-
mals to make trade-offs like delaying migration, delaying reproduc-
tion, reducing growth, or migrating with reduced energy reserves.83
The opinion does not give whales standing; no such radical move is
necessary to reach the clear result that the program is unacceptable. But
it does recognize whales as beings with a complex and active form of life
that includes emotional well-being, affiliation, and free movement: in
short, a variety of species-specific forms of agency.84 The opinion goes
well beyond Bentham, and it also eschews the anthropocentric approach.
It is a harbinger, it is to be hoped, of a new era in the law of animal wel-
fare.
83. Id. at 1130-31.
84. See id.
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